- 13 Nov, 2008 3 commits
-
-
David Howells authored
Pass credentials through dentry_open() so that the COW creds patch can have SELinux's flush_unauthorized_files() pass the appropriate creds back to itself when it opens its null chardev. The security_dentry_open() call also now takes a creds pointer, as does the dentry_open hook in struct security_operations. Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by:
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by:
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
David Howells authored
Separate the task security context from task_struct. At this point, the security data is temporarily embedded in the task_struct with two pointers pointing to it. Note that the Alpha arch is altered as it refers to (E)UID and (E)GID in entry.S via asm-offsets. With comment fixes Signed-off-by: Marc Dionne <marc.c.dionne@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by:
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Acked-by:
Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
David Howells authored
Take away the ability for sys_capset() to affect processes other than current. This means that current will not need to lock its own credentials when reading them against interference by other processes. This has effectively been the case for a while anyway, since: (1) Without LSM enabled, sys_capset() is disallowed. (2) With file-based capabilities, sys_capset() is neutered. Signed-off-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Acked-by:
Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by:
Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by:
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Signed-off-by:
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
- 21 Oct, 2008 1 commit
-
-
Al Viro authored
Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
- 13 Oct, 2008 1 commit
-
-
Alan Cox authored
We now have the infrastructure to sort this out but rather than teaching the syscall tty lock rules we move the hard work into a tty helper Signed-off-by:
Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 01 Aug, 2008 1 commit
-
-
Al Viro authored
New primitive: alloc_fd(start, flags). get_unused_fd() and get_unused_fd_flags() become wrappers on top of it. Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
- 26 Jul, 2008 9 commits
-
-
Al Viro authored
* dup2() should return -EBADF on exceeded sysctl_nr_open * dup() should *not* return -EINVAL even if you have rlimit set to 0; it should get -EMFILE instead. Check for orig_start exceeding rlimit taken to sys_fcntl(). Failing expand_files() in dup{2,3}() now gets -EMFILE remapped to -EBADF. Consequently, remaining checks for rlimit are taken to expand_files(). Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
Al Viro authored
* do not pass nameidata; struct path is all the callers want. * switch to new helpers: user_path_at(dfd, pathname, flags, &path) user_path(pathname, &path) user_lpath(pathname, &path) user_path_dir(pathname, &path) (fail if not a directory) The last 3 are trivial macro wrappers for the first one. * remove nameidata in callers. Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
Al Viro authored
Almost all users __user_walk_fd() and friends care only about struct path. Get rid of the few that do not. Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
Al Viro authored
Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
Miklos Szeredi authored
Move the immutable and append-only checks from chmod, chown and utimes into notify_change(). Checks for immutable and append-only files are always performed by the VFS and not by the filesystem (see permission() and may_...() in namei.c), so these belong in notify_change(), and not in inode_change_ok(). This should be completely equivalent. CC: Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com> CC: Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
Al Viro authored
* MAY_CHDIR is redundant - it's an equivalent of MAY_ACCESS * MAY_ACCESS on fuse should affect only the last step of pathname resolution * fchdir() and chroot() should pass MAY_ACCESS, for the same reason why chdir() needs that. * now that we pass MAY_ACCESS explicitly in all cases, LOOKUP_ACCESS can be removed; it has no business being in nameidata. Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
Al Viro authored
long overdue... Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
Al Viro authored
... so we ought to pass MAY_CHDIR to vfs_permission() instead of having it triggered on every step of preceding pathname resolution. LOOKUP_CHDIR is killed by that. Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
Miklos Szeredi authored
vfs_permission(MAY_WRITE) already checked for the inode being immutable, so no need to repeat it. Signed-off-by:
Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz> Acked-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>
-
- 24 Jul, 2008 1 commit
-
-
Jon Tollefson authored
Adds a check for an overflow in the filesystem size so if someone is checking with statfs() on a 16G blocksize hugetlbfs in a 32bit binary that it will report back EOVERFLOW instead of a size of 0. Acked-by:
Nishanth Aravamudan <nacc@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Jon Tollefson <kniht@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 04 Jul, 2008 1 commit
-
-
Andrew G. Morgan authored
This commit includes a bugfix for the fragile setuid fixup code in the case that filesystem capabilities are supported (in access()). The effect of this fix is gated on filesystem capability support because changing securebits is only supported when filesystem capabilities support is configured.) [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by:
Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Acked-by:
Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by:
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 01 May, 2008 1 commit
-
-
Al Viro authored
Initial splitoff of the low-level stuff; taken to fdtable.h Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
- 28 Apr, 2008 1 commit
-
-
Nick Piggin authored
Convert XIP to support non-struct page backed memory, using VM_MIXEDMAP for the user mappings. This requires the get_xip_page API to be changed to an address based one. Improve the API layering a little bit too, while we're here. This is required in order to support XIP filesystems on memory that isn't backed with struct page (but memory with struct page is still supported too). Signed-off-by:
Nick Piggin <npiggin@suse.de> Acked-by:
Carsten Otte <cotte@de.ibm.com> Cc: Jared Hulbert <jaredeh@gmail.com> Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com> Cc: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 19 Apr, 2008 7 commits
-
-
Dave Hansen authored
There have been a few oopses caused by 'struct file's with NULL f_vfsmnts. There was also a set of potentially missed mnt_want_write()s from dentry_open() calls. This patch provides a very simple debugging framework to catch these kinds of bugs. It will WARN_ON() them, but should stop us from having any oopses or mnt_writer count imbalances. I'm quite convinced that this is a good thing because it found bugs in the stuff I was working on as soon as I wrote it. [hch: made it conditional on a debug option. But it's still a little bit too ugly] [hch: merged forced remount r/o fix from Dave and akpm's fix for the fix] Signed-off-by:
Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Acked-by:
Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
Dave Hansen authored
It is OK to let access() go without using a mnt_want/drop_write() pair because it doesn't actually do writes to the filesystem, and it is inherently racy anyway. This is a rare case when it is OK to use __mnt_is_readonly() directly. Acked-by:
Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
Dave Hansen authored
Acked-by:
Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
Dave Hansen authored
chown/chmod,etc... don't call permission in the same way that the normal "open for write" calls do. They still write to the filesystem, so bump the write count during these operations. Acked-by:
Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
Dave Hansen authored
This is the first really tricky patch in the series. It elevates the writer count on a mount each time a non-special file is opened for write. We used to do this in may_open(), but Miklos pointed out that __dentry_open() is used as well to create filps. This will cover even those cases, while a call in may_open() would not have. There is also an elevated count around the vfs_create() call in open_namei(). See the comments for more details, but we need this to fix a 'create, remount, fail r/w open()' race. Some filesystems forego the use of normal vfs calls to create struct files. Make sure that these users elevate the mnt writer count because they will get __fput(), and we need to make sure they're balanced. Acked-by:
Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
Christoph Hellwig authored
open_namei() will, in the future, need to take mount write counts over its creation and truncation (via may_open()) operations. It needs to keep these write counts until any potential filp that is created gets __fput()'d. This gets complicated in the error handling and becomes very murky as to how far open_namei() actually got, and whether or not that mount write count was taken. That makes it a bad interface. All that the current do_filp_open() really does is allocate the nameidata on the stack, then call open_namei(). So, this merges those two functions and moves filp_open() over to namei.c so it can be close to its buddy: do_filp_open(). It also gets a kerneldoc comment in the process. Acked-by:
Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
Dave Hansen authored
My end goal here is to make sure all users of may_open() return filps. This will ensure that we properly release mount write counts which were taken for the filp in may_open(). This patch moves the sys_open flags to namei flags calculation into fs/namei.c. We'll shortly be moving the nameidata_to_filp() calls into namei.c, and this gets the sys_open flags to a place where we can get at them when we need them. Acked-by:
Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
- 10 Apr, 2008 1 commit
-
-
Roland McGrath authored
The prevent_tail_call() macro works around the problem of the compiler clobbering argument words on the stack, which for asmlinkage functions is the caller's (user's) struct pt_regs. The tail/sibling-call optimization is not the only way that the compiler can decide to use stack argument words as scratch space, which we have to prevent. Other optimizations can do it too. Until we have new compiler support to make "asmlinkage" binding on the compiler's own use of the stack argument frame, we have work around all the manifestations of this issue that crop up. More cases seem to be prevented by also keeping the incoming argument variables live at the end of the function. This makes their original stack slots attractive places to leave those variables, so the compiler tends not clobber them for something else. It's still no guarantee, but it handles some observed cases that prevent_tail_call() did not. Signed-off-by:
Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 19 Mar, 2008 1 commit
-
-
Christoph Hellwig authored
Make sure no-one calls dentry_open with a NULL vfsmount argument and crap out with a stacktrace otherwise. A NULL file->f_vfsmnt has always been problematic, but with the per-mount r/o tracking we can't accept anymore at all. [AV] the last place that passed NULL had been eliminated by the previous patch (reiserfs xattr stuff) Acked-by:
Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> Signed-off-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
Dave Hansen <haveblue@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
- 15 Feb, 2008 3 commits
-
-
Jan Blunck authored
In nearly all cases the set_fs_{root,pwd}() calls work on a struct path. Change the function to reflect this and use path_get() here. Signed-off-by:
Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Acked-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
Jan Blunck authored
* Add path_put() functions for releasing a reference to the dentry and vfsmount of a struct path in the right order * Switch from path_release(nd) to path_put(&nd->path) * Rename dput_path() to path_put_conditional() [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs] Signed-off-by:
Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Acked-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
Jan Blunck authored
This is the central patch of a cleanup series. In most cases there is no good reason why someone would want to use a dentry for itself. This series reflects that fact and embeds a struct path into nameidata. Together with the other patches of this series - it enforced the correct order of getting/releasing the reference count on <dentry,vfsmount> pairs - it prepares the VFS for stacking support since it is essential to have a struct path in every place where the stack can be traversed - it reduces the overall code size: without patch series: text data bss dec hex filename 5321639 858418 715768 6895825 6938d1 vmlinux with patch series: text data bss dec hex filename 5320026 858418 715768 6894212 693284 vmlinux This patch: Switch from nd->{dentry,mnt} to nd->path.{dentry,mnt} everywhere. [akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix cifs] [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix smack] Signed-off-by:
Jan Blunck <jblunck@suse.de> Signed-off-by:
Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de> Acked-by:
Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de> Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 08 Feb, 2008 2 commits
-
-
Arjan van de Ven authored
These exports (which aren't used and which are in fact dangerous to use because they pretty much form a security hole to use) have been marked _UNUSED since 2.6.24 with removal in 2.6.25. This patch is their final departure from the Linux kernel tree. Signed-off-by:
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
Harvey Harrison authored
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style fixes] Signed-off-by:
Harvey Harrison <harvey.harrison@gmail.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 14 Nov, 2007 1 commit
-
-
Arjan van de Ven authored
sys_open / sys_read were used in the early 1.2 days to load firmware from disk inside drivers. Since 2.0 or so this was deprecated behavior, but several drivers still were using this. Since a few years we have a request_firmware() API that implements this in a nice, consistent way. Only some old ISA sound drivers (pre-ALSA) still straggled along for some time.... however with commit c2b1239a the last user is now gone. This is a good thing, since using sys_open / sys_read etc for firmware is a very buggy to dangerous thing to do; these operations put an fd in the process file descriptor table.... which then can be tampered with from other threads for example. For those who don't want the firmware loader, filp_open()/vfs_read are the better APIs to use, without this security issue. The patch below marks sys_open and sys_read unused now that they're really not used anymore, and for deletion in the 2.6.25 timeframe. Signed-off-by:
Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 21 Oct, 2007 1 commit
-
-
Al Viro authored
makes caller simpler *and* allows to scan ancestors Signed-off-by:
Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
-
- 17 Oct, 2007 2 commits
-
-
Serge E. Hallyn authored
Implement file posix capabilities. This allows programs to be given a subset of root's powers regardless of who runs them, without having to use setuid and giving the binary all of root's powers. This version works with Kaigai Kohei's userspace tools, found at http://www.kaigai.gr.jp/index.php. For more information on how to use this patch, Chris Friedhoff has posted a nice page at http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html. Changelog: Nov 27: Incorporate fixes from Andrew Morton (security-introduce-file-caps-tweaks and security-introduce-file-caps-warning-fix) Fix Kconfig dependency. Fix change signaling behavior when file caps are not compiled in. Nov 13: Integrate comments from Alexey: Remove CONFIG_ ifdef from capability.h, and use %zd for printing a size_t. Nov 13: Fix endianness warnings by sparse as suggested by Alexey Dobriyan. Nov 09: Address warnings of unused variables at cap_bprm_set_security when file capabilities are disabled, and simultaneously clean up the code a little, by pulling the new code into a helper function. Nov 08: For pointers to required userspace tools and how to use them, see http://www.friedhoff.org/fscaps.html . Nov 07: Fix the calculation of the highest bit checked in check_cap_sanity(). Nov 07: Allow file caps to be enabled without CONFIG_SECURITY, since capabilities are the default. Hook cap_task_setscheduler when !CONFIG_SECURITY. Move capable(TASK_KILL) to end of cap_task_kill to reduce audit messages. Nov 05: Add secondary calls in selinux/hooks.c to task_setioprio and task_setscheduler so that selinux and capabilities with file cap support can be stacked. Sep 05: As Seth Arnold points out, uid checks are out of place for capability code. Sep 01: Define task_setscheduler, task_setioprio, cap_task_kill, and task_setnice to make sure a user cannot affect a process in which they called a program with some fscaps. One remaining question is the note under task_setscheduler: are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being sufficient to confine a process to a cpuset? It is a semantic change, as without fsccaps, attach_task doesn't allow CAP_SYS_NICE to override the uid equivalence check. But since it uses security_task_setscheduler, which elsewhere is used where CAP_SYS_NICE can be used to override the uid equivalence check, fixing it might be tough. task_setscheduler note: this also controls cpuset:attach_task. Are we ok with CAP_SYS_NICE being used to confine to a cpuset? task_setioprio task_setnice sys_setpriority uses this (through set_one_prio) for another process. Need same checks as setrlimit Aug 21: Updated secureexec implementation to reflect the fact that euid and uid might be the same and nonzero, but the process might still have elevated caps. Aug 15: Handle endianness of xattrs. Enforce capability version match between kernel and disk. Enforce that no bits beyond the known max capability are set, else return -EPERM. With this extra processing, it may be worth reconsidering doing all the work at bprm_set_security rather than d_instantiate. Aug 10: Always call getxattr at bprm_set_security, rather than caching it at d_instantiate. [morgan@kernel.org: file-caps clean up for linux/capability.h] [bunk@kernel.org: unexport cap_inode_killpriv] Signed-off-by:
Serge E. Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> Cc: Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morgan <morgan@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
Alan Cox authored
The early LFS work that Linux uses favours EFBIG in various places. SuSv3 specifically uses EOVERFLOW for this as noted by Michael (Bug 7253) [EOVERFLOW] The named file is a regular file and the size of the file cannot be represented correctly in an object of type off_t. We should therefore transition to the proper error return code Signed-off-by:
Alan Cox <alan@redhat.com> Cc: Theodore Tso <tytso@mit.edu> Cc: Jens Axboe <jens.axboe@oracle.com> Cc: Arjan van de Ven <arjan@infradead.org> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 16 Oct, 2007 1 commit
-
-
Yuichi Nakamura authored
It reduces the selinux overhead on read/write by only revalidating permissions in selinux_file_permission if the task or inode labels have changed or the policy has changed since the open-time check. A new LSM hook, security_dentry_open, is added to capture the necessary state at open time to allow this optimization. (see http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=118972995207740&w=2 ) Signed-off-by: Yuichi Nakamura<ynakam@hitachisoft.jp> Acked-by:
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> Signed-off-by:
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
-
- 31 Jul, 2007 1 commit
-
-
david m. richter authored
It is possible that another process could acquire a new file lease right after break_lease() is called during a truncate, but before lease-granting is disabled by the subsequent get_write_access(). Merely switching the order of the break_lease() and get_write_access() calls prevents this race. Signed-off-by:
David M. Richter <richterd@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by:
"J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@citi.umich.edu> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-
- 24 Jul, 2007 1 commit
-
-
Ulrich Drepper authored
The fallocate syscall returns ENOSYS in case the filesystem does not support the operation and expects the userlevel code to fill in. This is good in concept. The problem is that the libc code for old kernels should be able to distinguish the case where the syscall is not at all available vs not functioning for a specific mount point. As is this is not possible and we always have to invoke the syscall even if the kernel doesn't support it. I suggest the following patch. Using EOPNOTSUPP is IMO the right thing to do. Cc: Amit Arora <aarora@in.ibm.com> Signed-off-by:
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> Signed-off-by:
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
-