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  1. 22 Jan, 2008 1 commit
  3. 17 Dec, 2007 1 commit
  5. 27 Nov, 2007 1 commit
  7. 03 Nov, 2007 1 commit
    • Jeff Layton's avatar
      [CIFS] implement upcalls for SPNEGO blob via keyctl API · 09fe7ba7
      Jeff Layton authored 
      
Add routines to handle upcalls to userspace via keyctl for the purpose
of getting a SPNEGO blob for a particular uid and server combination.

Clean up the Makefile a bit and set it up to only compile cifs_spnego
if CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL is set. Also change CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL to depend
on CONFIG_KEYS rather than CONFIG_CONNECTOR.

cifs_spnego.h defines the communications between kernel and userspace
and is intended to be shared with userspace programs.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarSteve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
      09fe7ba7
  9. 30 Oct, 2007 1 commit
  11. 19 Oct, 2007 1 commit
  13. 17 Oct, 2007 5 commits
    • Andreas Dilger's avatar
      Ext4: Uninitialized Block Groups · 717d50e4
      Andreas Dilger authored 
      
In pass1 of e2fsck, every inode table in the fileystem is scanned and checked,
regardless of whether it is in use.  This is this the most time consuming part
of the filesystem check.  The unintialized block group feature can greatly
reduce e2fsck time by eliminating checking of uninitialized inodes.

With this feature, there is a a high water mark of used inodes for each block
group.  Block and inode bitmaps can be uninitialized on disk via a flag in the
group descriptor to avoid reading or scanning them at e2fsck time.  A checksum
of each group descriptor is used to ensure that corruption in the group
descriptor's bit flags does not cause incorrect operation.

The feature is enabled through a mkfs option

	mke2fs /dev/ -O uninit_groups

A patch adding support for uninitialized block groups to e2fsprogs tools has
been posted to the linux-ext4 mailing list.

The patches have been stress tested with fsstress and fsx.  In performance
tests testing e2fsck time, we have seen that e2fsck time on ext3 grows
linearly with the total number of inodes in the filesytem.  In ext4 with the
uninitialized block groups feature, the e2fsck time is constant, based
solely on the number of used inodes rather than the total inode count.
Since typical ext4 filesystems only use 1-10% of their inodes, this feature can
greatly reduce e2fsck time for users.  With performance improvement of 2-20
times, depending on how full the filesystem is.

The attached graph shows the major improvements in e2fsck times in filesystems
with a large total inode count, but few inodes in use.

In each group descriptor if we have

EXT4_BG_INODE_UNINIT set in bg_flags:
        Inode table is not initialized/used in this group. So we can skip
        the consistency check during fsck.
EXT4_BG_BLOCK_UNINIT set in bg_flags:
        No block in the group is used. So we can skip the block bitmap
        verification for this group.

We also add two new fields to group descriptor as a part of
uninitialized group patch.

        __le16  bg_itable_unused;       /* Unused inodes count */
        __le16  bg_checksum;            /* crc16(sb_uuid+group+desc) */

bg_itable_unused:

If we have EXT4_BG_INODE_UNINIT not set in bg_flags
then bg_itable_unused will give the offset within
the inode table till the inodes are used. This can be
used by fsck to skip list of inodes that are marked unused.

bg_checksum:
Now that we depend on bg_flags and bg_itable_unused to determine
the block and inode usage, we need to make sure group descriptor
is not corrupt. We add checksum to group descriptor to
detect corruption. If the descriptor is found to be corrupt, we
mark all the blocks and inodes in the group used.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAvantika Mathur <mathur@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndreas Dilger <adilger@clusterfs.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarMingming Cao <cmm@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
      717d50e4
    • Jan Engelhardt's avatar
      menuconfig: transform Network Filesystems menu · ea0985ad
      Jan Engelhardt authored 
      
Turn Network File Systems into a menuconfig so that it can be disabled at
once.

(Note: I added a "default y". If you do not like that, speak up.)
Signed-off-by: default avatarJan Engelhardt <jengelh@gmx.de>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
Cc: "J. Bruce Fields" <bfields@fieldses.org>
Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: Eric Van Hensbergen <ericvh@hera.kernel.org>
Cc: Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      ea0985ad
    • Jan Kara's avatar
      quota: send messages via netlink · 8e893469
      Jan Kara authored 
      
Implement sending of quota messages via netlink interface.  The advantage
is that in userspace we can better decide what to do with the message - for
example display a dialogue in your X session or just write the message to
the console.  As a bonus, we can get rid of problems with console locking
deep inside filesystem code once we remove the old printing mechanism.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      8e893469
    • Robert P. J. Day's avatar
      Remove valueless definition of hard-selected RAMFS option · 8e3f715a
      Robert P. J. Day authored 
      
Since CONFIG_RAMFS is currently hard-selected to "y", and since
Documentation/filesystems/ramfs-rootfs-initramfs.txt reads as follows:

"The amount of code required to implement ramfs is tiny, because all the
work is done by the existing Linux caching infrastructure.  Basically,
you're mounting the disk cache as a filesystem.  Because of this, ramfs is
not an optional component removable via menuconfig, since there would be
negligible space savings."

It seems pointless to leave this as a Kconfig entry.
Signed-off-by: default avatarRobert P. J. Day <rpjday@mindspring.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      8e3f715a
    • Adrian Bunk's avatar
      allow disabling DNOTIFY without EMBEDDED · 7e341fa1
      Adrian Bunk authored 
      
Allow disabling DNOTIFY with CONFIG_EMBEDDED=n.

I'm currently running a kernel with dnotify disabled and I haven't run into
any problem.  Is there any popular application left that breaks without
dnotify support in the kernel?

Note that this patch does not remove dnotify support, it still defaults to
"y", and the help text recommends enabling it.
Signed-off-by: default avatarAdrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Acked-by: default avatarStephen Rothwell <sfr@canb.auug.org.au>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      7e341fa1
  15. 09 Oct, 2007 2 commits
  17. 11 Sep, 2007 1 commit
  19. 02 Aug, 2007 1 commit
  21. 19 Jul, 2007 1 commit
  23. 18 Jul, 2007 1 commit
    • Jose R. Santos's avatar
      jbd2: Move jbd2-debug file to debugfs · 0f49d5d0
      Jose R. Santos authored 
      
The jbd2-debug file used to be located in /proc/sys/fs/jbd2-debug, but it
incorrectly used create_proc_entry() instead of the sysctl routines, and
no proc entry was ever created.

Instead of fixing this we might as well move the jbd2-debug file to
debugfs which would be the preferred location for this kind of tunable.
The new location is now /sys/kernel/debug/jbd2/jbd2-debug.
Signed-off-by: default avatarJose R. Santos <jrs@us.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatar"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
      0f49d5d0
  25. 17 Jul, 2007 1 commit
  27. 14 Jul, 2007 1 commit
  29. 11 Jul, 2007 3 commits
  31. 10 Jul, 2007 1 commit
  33. 11 Jun, 2007 1 commit
  35. 09 May, 2007 1 commit
  37. 08 May, 2007 1 commit
    • Randy Dunlap's avatar
      reiserfs: proc support requires PROC_FS · 880ebdc5
      Randy Dunlap authored 
      
REISER_FS /proc option needs to depend on PROC_FS.

fs/reiserfs/procfs.c: In function 'show_super':
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:134: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'max_hash_collisions'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:134: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'breads'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:135: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'bread_miss'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:135: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'search_by_key'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:136: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'search_by_key_fs_changed'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:136: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'search_by_key_restarted'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:137: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'insert_item_restarted'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:137: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'paste_into_item_restarted'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:138: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'cut_from_item_restarted'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:139: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'delete_solid_item_restarted'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:139: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'delete_item_restarted'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:140: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'leaked_oid'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:140: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'leaves_removable'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c: In function 'show_per_level':
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:184: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'balance_at'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:185: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'sbk_read_at'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:186: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'sbk_fs_changed'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:187: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'sbk_restarted'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:188: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'free_at'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:189: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'items_at'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:190: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'can_node_be_removed'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:191: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'lnum'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:192: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'rnum'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:193: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'lbytes'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:194: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'rbytes'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:195: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'get_neighbors'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:196: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'get_neighbors_restart'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:197: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'need_l_neighbor'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:197: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'need_r_neighbor'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c: In function 'show_bitmap':
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:224: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'free_block'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:225: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'scan_bitmap'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:226: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'scan_bitmap'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:227: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'scan_bitmap'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:228: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'scan_bitmap'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:229: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'scan_bitmap'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:230: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'scan_bitmap'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:230: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'scan_bitmap'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c: In function 'show_journal':
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:384: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:385: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:386: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:387: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:388: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:389: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:390: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:391: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:392: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:393: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:394: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:395: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:395: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:395: error: 'reiserfs_proc_info_data_t' has no member named 'journal'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c: In function 'reiserfs_proc_info_init':
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:504: warning: implicit declaration of function '__PINFO'
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:504: error: request for member 'lock' in something not a structure or union
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c: In function 'reiserfs_proc_info_done':
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:544: error: request for member 'lock' in something not a structure or union
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:545: error: request for member 'exiting' in something not a structure or union
fs/reiserfs/procfs.c:546: error: request for member 'lock' in something not a structure or union
Signed-off-by: default avatarRandy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      880ebdc5
  39. 03 May, 2007 1 commit
    • David Howells's avatar
      [AFS/AF_RXRPC]: Miscellaneous fixes. · 80c72fe4
      David Howells authored 
      
Make miscellaneous fixes to AFS and AF_RXRPC:

 (*) Make AF_RXRPC select KEYS rather than RXKAD or AFS_FS in Kconfig.

 (*) Don't use FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA.

 (*) Remove a done 'TODO' item in a comemnt on afs_get_sb().

 (*) Don't pass a void * as the page pointer argument of kmap_atomic() as this
     breaks on m68k.  Patch from Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>.

 (*) Use match_*() functions rather than doing my own parsing.
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarDavid S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
      80c72fe4
  41. 01 May, 2007 1 commit
  43. 27 Apr, 2007 1 commit
  45. 26 Apr, 2007 2 commits
  47. 17 Feb, 2007 1 commit
  49. 13 Feb, 2007 1 commit
  51. 12 Feb, 2007 1 commit
    • Michael Halcrow's avatar
      [PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key transport mechanism · 88b4a07e
      Michael Halcrow authored 
      
This is the transport code for public key functionality in eCryptfs.  It
manages encryption/decryption request queues with a transport mechanism.
Currently, netlink is the only implemented transport.

Each inode has a unique File Encryption Key (FEK).  Under passphrase, a File
Encryption Key Encryption Key (FEKEK) is generated from a salt/passphrase
combo on mount.  This FEKEK encrypts each FEK and writes it into the header of
each file using the packet format specified in RFC 2440.  This is all
symmetric key encryption, so it can all be done via the kernel crypto API.

These new patches introduce public key encryption of the FEK.  There is no
asymmetric key encryption support in the kernel crypto API, so eCryptfs pushes
the FEK encryption and decryption out to a userspace daemon.  After
considering our requirements and determining the complexity of using various
transport mechanisms, we settled on netlink for this communication.

eCryptfs stores authentication tokens into the kernel keyring.  These tokens
correlate with individual keys.  For passphrase mode of operation, the
authentication token contains the symmetric FEKEK.  For public key, the
authentication token contains a PKI type and an opaque data blob managed by
individual PKI modules in userspace.

Each user who opens a file under an eCryptfs partition mounted in public key
mode must be running a daemon.  That daemon has the user's credentials and has
access to all of the keys to which the user should have access.  The daemon,
when started, initializes the pluggable PKI modules available on the system
and registers itself with the eCryptfs kernel module.  Userspace utilities
register public key authentication tokens into the user session keyring.
These authentication tokens correlate key signatures with PKI modules and PKI
blobs.  The PKI blobs contain PKI-specific information necessary for the PKI
module to carry out asymmetric key encryption and decryption.

When the eCryptfs module parses the header of an existing file and finds a Tag
1 (Public Key) packet (see RFC 2440), it reads in the public key identifier
(signature).  The asymmetrically encrypted FEK is in the Tag 1 packet;
eCryptfs puts together a decrypt request packet containing the signature and
the encrypted FEK, then it passes it to the daemon registered for the
current->euid via a netlink unicast to the PID of the daemon, which was
registered at the time the daemon was started by the user.

The daemon actually just makes calls to libecryptfs, which implements request
packet parsing and manages PKI modules.  libecryptfs grabs the public key
authentication token for the given signature from the user session keyring.
This auth tok tells libecryptfs which PKI module should receive the request.
libecryptfs then makes a decrypt() call to the PKI module, and it passes along
the PKI block from the auth tok.  The PKI uses the blob to figure out how it
should decrypt the data passed to it; it performs the decryption and passes
the decrypted data back to libecryptfs.  libecryptfs then puts together a
reply packet with the decrypted FEK and passes that back to the eCryptfs
module.

The eCryptfs module manages these request callouts to userspace code via
message context structs.  The module maintains an array of message context
structs and places the elements of the array on two lists: a free and an
allocated list.  When eCryptfs wants to make a request, it moves a msg ctx
from the free list to the allocated list, sets its state to pending, and fires
off the message to the user's registered daemon.

When eCryptfs receives a netlink message (via the callback), it correlates the
msg ctx struct in the alloc list with the data in the message itself.  The
msg->index contains the offset of the array of msg ctx structs.  It verifies
that the registered daemon PID is the same as the PID of the process that sent
the message.  It also validates a sequence number between the received packet
and the msg ctx.  Then, it copies the contents of the message (the reply
packet) into the msg ctx struct, sets the state in the msg ctx to done, and
wakes up the process that was sleeping while waiting for the reply.

The sleeping process was whatever was performing the sys_open().  This process
originally called ecryptfs_send_message(); it is now in
ecryptfs_wait_for_response().  When it wakes up and sees that the msg ctx
state was set to done, it returns a pointer to the message contents (the reply
packet) and returns.  If all went well, this packet contains the decrypted
FEK, which is then copied into the crypt_stat struct, and life continues as
normal.

The case for creation of a new file is very similar, only instead of a decrypt
request, eCryptfs sends out an encrypt request.

> - We have a great clod of key mangement code in-kernel.  Why is that
>   not suitable (or growable) for public key management?

eCryptfs uses Howells' keyring to store persistent key data and PKI state
information.  It defers public key cryptographic transformations to userspace
code.  The userspace data manipulation request really is orthogonal to key
management in and of itself.  What eCryptfs basically needs is a secure way to
communicate with a particular daemon for a particular task doing a syscall,
based on the UID.  Nothing running under another UID should be able to access
that channel of communication.

> - Is it appropriate that new infrastructure for public key
> management be private to a particular fs?

The messaging.c file contains a lot of code that, perhaps, could be extracted
into a separate kernel service.  In essence, this would be a sort of
request/reply mechanism that would involve a userspace daemon.  I am not aware
of anything that does quite what eCryptfs does, so I was not aware of any
existing tools to do just what we wanted.

>   What happens if one of these daemons exits without sending a quit
>   message?

There is a stale uid<->pid association in the hash table for that user.  When
the user registers a new daemon, eCryptfs cleans up the old association and
generates a new one.  See ecryptfs_process_helo().

> - _why_ does it use netlink?

Netlink provides the transport mechanism that would minimize the complexity of
the implementation, given that we can have multiple daemons (one per user).  I
explored the possibility of using relayfs, but that would involve having to
introduce control channels and a protocol for creating and tearing down
channels for the daemons.  We do not have to worry about any of that with
netlink.
Signed-off-by: default avatarMichael Halcrow <mhalcrow@us.ibm.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: default avatarAndrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: default avatarLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
      88b4a07e
  53. 11 Feb, 2007 1 commit
  55. 07 Feb, 2007 1 commit
  57. 22 Dec, 2006 1 commit
  59. 12 Dec, 2006 2 commits
  61. 29 Nov, 2006 1 commit