• Stephen Smalley's avatar
    Security: split proc ptrace checking into read vs. attach · 006ebb40
    Stephen Smalley authored
    Enable security modules to distinguish reading of process state via
    proc from full ptrace access by renaming ptrace_may_attach to
    ptrace_may_access and adding a mode argument indicating whether only
    read access or full attach access is requested.  This allows security
    modules to permit access to reading process state without granting
    full ptrace access.  The base DAC/capability checking remains unchanged.
    
    Read access to /proc/pid/mem continues to apply a full ptrace attach
    check since check_mem_permission() already requires the current task
    to already be ptracing the target.  The other ptrace checks within
    proc for elements like environ, maps, and fds are changed to pass the
    read mode instead of attach.
    
    In the SELinux case, we model such reading of process state as a
    reading of a proc file labeled with the target process' label.  This
    enables SELinux policy to permit such reading of process state without
    permitting control or manipulation of the ...
    006ebb40
commoncap.c 17.2 KB