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Check that the permissions on the properties file
are exactly as we expect them to be.

Make sure we close the fd if fstat fails.

Refactor the code slightly.

Change-Id: I5503fd58c3b8093ce7e6d05920748ed70eaf8e2c

prctl.h uses __BEGIN_DECLS but fails to include sys/cdefs.h
(where it's defined).  Code which includes prctl.h without
previously including sys/cdefs.h will fail to compile.

Fixed.

Change-Id: If4c9f3308f08b93596dcd00e351ae786807e9320

Currently, system properties are passed via the environment
variable ANDROID_PROPERTY_WORKSPACE and a file descriptor passed
from parent to child. This is insecure for setuid executables,
as the environment variable can be changed by the caller.

Modify system property handling so that we get the properties
from a root owned properties file, rather than using an
environment variable.  Fall back to the environment variable
if the file doesn't exist.

Bug: 8045561
Change-Id: I54f3efa98cf7d63d88788da5ce0d19e34fd7851a

We don't know that they're not going to be cleaned up by a
C++ global destructor that runs after us. This is the case with
bootanimation, for example.

Bug: 7291287
Change-Id: Iba402514d1735fdc2ae4bc95b65396d816be46c0

When each shell leaks ~240 allocations, you can't see the leaks from
the program you ran with "adb shell".

Bug: 7291287
Change-Id: Ib8780db72ba0114ebdb24768537da74bbb61f354

Change-Id: I45251047202a229f9175735ecc23c0ebcda71e8d

Just take the upstream NetBSD code.

Bug: http://code.google.com/p/android/issues/detail?id=43078
Change-Id: Ibbbde9d00e8bc6a09c9503aab2b04b4e3d1f98b0

Change-Id: I88afe0201ee5766a295fc5a9e710fba9d6e0d363

Bug: 7291287
Change-Id: Ia7aa386e8b75b8058d7d9e707e11b1da7dc62f00

Both libc/include/sys/auxv.h and libc/private/bionic_auxv.h
use _SYS_AUXV_H_ to see if a header file has already been included.
This prevents both of these files from being included at the same
time.

Fix this name conflict.

Change-Id: Ifaec88aa9779d784b95f8e75145117acf3d5cfc5

Change-Id: Idbf24ce8482ff03f24caa89bafb08677b1c5cec3

Change-Id: Icbc67375282f2a22dce02e4bacab15ddae846057

We had two copies of the backtrace code, and two copies of the
libcorkscrew /proc/pid/maps code. This patch gets us down to one.

We also had hacks so we could log in the malloc debugging code.
This patch pulls the non-allocating "printf" code out of the
dynamic linker so everyone can share.

This patch also makes the leak diagnostics easier to read, and
makes it possible to paste them directly into the 'stack' tool (by
using relative PCs).

This patch also fixes the stdio standard stream leak that was
causing a leak warning every time tf_daemon ran.

Bug: 7291287
Change-Id: I66e4083ac2c5606c8d2737cb45c8ac8a32c7cfe8

Temporarily revert the change since DNS resolution seems
broken right now in ping util.

Bug: 8029617

This reverts commit a0f64756.

Don't do the fortify_source checks if we can determine, at
compile time, that the provided operation is safe.

This avoids silliness like calling fortify source on things like:

  size_t len = strlen("asdf");
  printf("%d\n", len);

and allows the compiler to optimize this code to:

  printf("%d\n", 4);

Defer to gcc's builtin functions instead of pointing our code
to the libc implementation.

Change-Id: I5e1dcb61946461c4afaaaa983e39f07c7a0df0ae

based on architecture.

The linker is essentially a shared library, and incorporates
it's own copy of libc. Even though it's unnecessary, currently
/system/bin/linker is exporting various libc symbols (only to
apps which explicitly dlopen /system/bin/linker)

Add --exclude-libs,ALL, which tells the static linker to mark
all of the imported libc symbols as hidden. This reduces the
size of /system/bin/linker from 92K to 67K with no obvious
loss in functionality.

  $ adb shell ls -l /system/bin/linker
  -rwxrwxrwx root     root        92260 2013-01-16 16:52 linker

  $ adb shell ls -l /system/bin/linker
  -rwxrwxrwx root     root        67660 2013-01-16 16:49 linker

Documentation on exclude-libs can be found at
http://sourceware.org/binutils/docs-2.21/ld/Options.html

Change-Id: I4508287770e4b7a845def2e6b4af969f9c866c6a

The AT_RANDOM changes broke setuid / setgid executables
such as "ping". When the linker executes a setuid program,
it cleans the environment, removing any invalid environment
entries, and adding "NULL"s to the end of the environment
array for each removed variable. Later on, we try to determine
the location of the aux environment variable, and get tripped
up by these extra NULLs.

Reverting this patch will get setuid executables working again,
but getauxval() is still broken for setuid programs because of
this bug.

This reverts commit e3a49a86.

Change-Id: I05c58a896b1fe32cfb5d95d43b096045cda0aa4a

Populate the stack canaries from the kernel supplied
AT_RANDOM value, which doesn't involve any system calls.
This is slightly faster (6 fewer syscalls) and avoids
unnecessarily reading /dev/urandom, which depletes entropy.

Bug: 7959813

Change-Id: If2b43100a2a9929666df3de56b6139fed969e0f1